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I. INTRODUCTION 
Before I discuss the accounting provisions of the FCP A, I 
would like to make a few random observations about the earlier 
discussions. Judging from the tenor of the first speaker, one might 
wonder why there has been such a great controversy over the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),1 an Act which actually has 
very little to do with foreign corrupt practices, at least in some of 
its applications. 
I disagree, in some respects, with what I have heard about 
the impact of the FCP A regarding the antibribery provisions.2 It 
may he that, in some countries, bribes are the rule rather than the 
exception. Every country in which there were payoffs, I believe, 
had strict laws against taking such payments. Nevertheless, 
businessmen and lawyers who practice in the international area 
have suggested to me that there continue to be problems in coun-
tries throughout the world. The Carter Administration argued 
that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, by prohibiting types of 
payments which arguably may not violate the intent of the Act, 
operates as an export disincentive. I do not know whether that is 
true or not. I would note, however, that President Carter was of 
the view that the lack of guidance on the antibribery provisions 
was itself an export disincentive, and that Justice Department 
guidance was necessary. 
II. THE ACCOUNTING PROVISIONS 
Let me try to put into context the controversy surrounding 
the accounting provisions. First, it is important to understand that 
* Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Washington, D.C.; Co-Chairman, ABA Ad Hoc 
Comm. on Revision of the FCPA, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law. 
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 102-104, 91 Stat. 
1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. V 1981)), reprinted in Ap-
pendix I, infra. 
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 and -2 (Supp. V 1981). 
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the accounting provisions are part of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, and apply to all issuers which register securities with the 
SEC.3 The provisions apply to all such issuers, whether or not 
they do business overseas. The Act, as it is applied through the ac-
counting provisions, has absolutely nothing to do with foreign cor-
rupt practices; it has to do with accounting, including the mainten-
ance of books and records, and the establishment and maintenance 
of a system of internal accounting controls. 
I think it is important to start with an understanding of how 
the Act was presented to the corporate community at the time it 
was passed, because the context in which the words were used 
and the purpose for which the accounting provisions were intend-
ed created the great controversy. It is important to understand 
that people who never heard of the bribery of foreign officials 
woke up one day and found that an Act had just been passed 
which applied to them in very significant ways. This was an Act 
which they had never heard of, had never thought involved them, 
had never paid any attention to, and had never understood. They 
listened to the lawyers and accountants explain it to them and still 
did not understand. Alan Levenson, a former director of the Divi-
sion of Corporate Finance, said that it was the most extensive ap-
plication of federal securities law to internal corporate affairs 
since the passage of the Acts in 1933 and 1934.4 
An American Bar Association Committee issued a guide to 
the new provision 5 which declared that, because the 1934 Act was 
concerned about financial disclosure which would assist investors 
in making investment decisions, the new accounting provisions 
were also directed at financial disclosure to investors. It is impor-
tant to understand what people were saying about the accounting 
provisions at the time. Daniel L. Goelzer, who is now General 
Counsel of the SEC, said: 
Finally the [Foreign Corrupt Practices] Act has important im-
plications for the Securities and Exchange Commission. The in-
corporation of the accounting provisions into the federal 
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp. V 1981). The accounting provisions are reprinted in 
Appendix I infra. 
4. Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Discussed at New 
York Law Journal Seminar, [1978] 451 SEC. REG . & L. REP. (BNA) D-1, D-1, quoting Alan B. 
Levenson, formerly Director of the Commission's Division of Corporate Finance, cited in 
Goelzer, Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act- the Federalization 
of Corporate Recordkeeping and Internal Control, 5 J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (1979). 
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securities laws confers on the Commission new rulemaking and 
enforcement authority over the control and recordkeeping mech-
anisms of its registrants. Broadly speaking, the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act reflects a Congressional determination that the 
scope of the federal securities laws and the Commission's 
authority should be expanded beyond the traditional ambit of 
disclosure requirements. Accordingly, the Commission's General 
Counsel, Ralph C. Ferrara, has noted that the scope and impact 
of the accounting provisions may be analagous to that of the an-
tifraud sections of the federal securities laws. In any event, the 
consequences of adding substantive requirements governing ac-
counting control to the federal securities laws may significantly 
augment the degree of federal involvement in the internal 
management of public corporations.6 
Mr. Goelzer's position is made clearer by the following statement: 
"While reporting issuers are already subject to the Commission's 
jurisdiction, the accounting provisions expand the Commission's 
authority over the issuer's information systems, analagous to that 
which it exercises over securities professionals." 7 This refers to 
the authority that the SEC has over broker dealers who are 
registered with it under section 17 of the Securities Exchange 
Act, which gives the SEC authority to define the records which 
the broker must keep and maintain.8 Section 17 does not have an 
explicit rulemaking provision in it, but the SEC argued that its 
general rulemaking grant was sufficient to give it this authority 
with respect to all issuers. 
I think it is fair to say that the first message that came from 
the SEC was that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was a way of 
assuring corporate accountability. It was viewed by some as a 
mechanism for furthering ideals of corporate governance which, up 
until that time, had been attempted primarily through jawboning 
by various Commissioners or by hoping that people would volun-
tarily cooperate. It was not then clear, nor is it now clear, that the 
SEC has the authority to do many of the things that it sought to do 
under the Act. For example, Harold M. Williams, former Chair-
5. ABA Comm. on Corp. Law and Accounting, A Guide to the N ew Section 13fb)(2) 
Accounting Requirem ents of the S ecurities E xchange Act of 1934, 34 Bus. LAW. 307 
(1978). 
6. Goelzer, Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-The 
Federalization of Corporate Recordkeeping and Internal Control, 5 J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (1979). 
7. Id. at 20. 
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78q (Supp. II 1978). 
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man of the Commission, asked then General Counsel Harvey L. 
Pitt what authority there might be to require companies to have 
audit committees comprised of independent directors. One of the 
sources of authority which General Counsel Pitt came up with was 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. It is hard to understand how 
the requirements of internal controls and accurate books and 
records can be interpreted to also require outside directors. State 
laws have no such requirements. Nor do state laws require that 
outside directors be put on audit committees, or that the audit 
committees be given the responsibility of making sure that the 
systems of internal control function properly. Nevertheless, the 
SEC asserts such authority. 
Business people were concerned about how far the SEC would 
push its authority. They became even more concerned when the 
SEC proposed a requirement that management report on internal 
controls. The fear was that people would be singled out. For exam-
ple, some staff members suggested that if someone put in an ex-
pense voucher for twenty dollars for a taxicab, and actually that 
person drove to the airport that day, or if someone put in a 
voucher for a meal and actually had gone out to eat with his 
girlfriend, then those people had violated the Act. There was no 
materiality threshhold with respect to what violated the accurate 
books and records provision, section 13(b)(2)(A). 
In addition, corporations which discovered they had an inter-
nal accounting control which was not working properly were 
automatically in violation of the law and subject to criminal 
penalties. It was hard to tell the business community that the SEC 
would be reasonable in its administration of the Act when it had 
staff members at conferences telling people that this Act meant 
exactly what it said. Even a mistake transposing figures would be 
a violation. Without a materiality standard, some people thought 
perfection was required. Of course, perfection is not possible. Any 
internal accounting control system is imperfect. You have to be 
able to review your systems of internal control; you have to have 
the ability to change it. Indeed, a system of internal controls 
which does not have the capability to undergo regular review and 
monitoring may not be a good system of internal accounting con-
trol. Part of the problem was that no one really knew. 
I think that, to date, fourteen cases have been brought by the 
SEC under the accounting provisions. There were, however, many 
more investigations, many involving assertions that the Act reach-
4
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ed conduct which was clearly not material in any sense. I can say 
that because I was involved in some of them. It is only fair to say 
that the Commission did not pursue most of these situations be-
yond the investigative stage. Nevertheless, the companies had to 
pay considerable legal fees to defend themselves. Word spread 
among the corporate community that certain types of behavior 
were being looked at by the SEC. This was troublesome to the cor-
porate community because the companies did not know what was 
expected of them. They would hear one thing from their lawyers, 
another thing from their accountants, and still another from the 
SEC. 
Partly as a result of this uncertainty, there was a movement 
which resulted in S. 708 being passed in the Senate. This Bill 
reworks the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.9 It is true that the 
momentum for amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is 
also attributable to its antibribery provisions and their effect on 
trade. But there was also the concern that corporations had over-
reacted, spending enormous amounts of money to change their 
systems of internal accounting control- sums which were not cost-
justified. Corporations still did not understand what was intended 
and what was meant, so there was pressure on both sides to try to 
change the provision. 
Let me describe briefly certain problems which occurred with 
the very simple language of the accounting provisions. The first is 
the lack of any materiality standard in the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act. In addition, there is the problem of deciding what 
"reasonable detail" means. These words were added at the last 
moment when Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, and it was done out of a concern that an unqualified standard 
might connote an unrealistic degree of precision. The addition of 
the words "in reasonable detail" makes clear that the records 
should conform to accepted methods of accounting which would 
prevent off-the-book slush funds and the payment of bribes. 
What does that language mean in the context of regular 
transactions, putting aside illegal payments, slush funds and 
bribes? As an example, suppose an invoice is sent to a customer 
and the invoice reflects that the sale amount is one hundred 
dollars. One hundred dollars is then owed and the payment is due. 
9. S. 708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), 127 CONG. REC. 13,983-85 (1981). These proposed 
changes to the FCPA are reprinted in Appendix II, infra. 
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The terms of the payment may or may not be included. Now 
assume that a separate document reflects an agreement with the 
purchaser that a purchase of fifty million dollars during a six-
month period will qualify him for a ten percent volume discount. If 
that agreement does not show up on the face of the original in-
voice, is there a violation? Taken in isolation, does the absence of 
the terms of the agreement constitute a violation? Some said that 
it did, and there was debate on this question. 
There is a problem of what to do when you have to take a 
group of documents to piece together what happened in some tran-
saction. Part of the answer may depend upon whether the 
auditors have been given access to all the documents, so they have 
the opportunity to know what is going on. If a second set of books 
exists, then we have a different type of problem, because that 
seemingly constitutes false entries. I am speaking of an in-
complete document which is accurate on its face, unless you take 
the position that it is inaccurate because it fails to reflect the dis-
count which was made available in a separate arrangement. 
There is another problem which stems from the use of the 
word "records" in the Act. On the implications of the use of the 
word "records," Dan Goelzer said: 
The scope of the accuracy requirement is not, however, limited 
to records which are a part of the accounting system or incident 
to the preparation of financial statements. Section 3(a)(37) of the 
Securities Exchange Act defines "records" to mean, "accounts, 
correspondence, memoranda, tapes, disk, paper, books, and other 
documents or transcribed information of any type, whether ex-
pressed in ordinary or machine language." Thus, Congress's use 
of the term "records" suggests that virtually any tangible em-
bodiment of information made or kept by an issuer is within the 
scope of section 102 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, at 
least if it pertains to the recording of "economic events." 10 
Goelzer's comments show what I believe to have been an 
unintended meaning applied to the word "records" by the SEC. 
The word "records" does appear in the Act, but the language does 
not limit the definition to "accounting records." The SEC's defini-
tion of the word is broader than was intended when the Act was 
written. Nevertheless, the SEC asserts the broadest possible 
meaning. Therefore, if someone keeps notes which do not ac-
10. Goelzer, supra note 6, at 23-24. 
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curately reflect what he wanted to say, he may be in trouble, even 
if the notes are not going anywhere. 
The four objectives of internal accounting control set forth in 
the statute come directly out of the accounting literature. They 
were deliberately taken from the accounting literature so that 
they would be understood by accountants. It was expected that 
people would interpret the language in the same way that account-
ants had been doing it for years. I would add, however, that the ac-
countants said that non-accountants would not understand the 
language, which was only intended for special accounting pur-
poses, and opposed incorporating accounting language into the 
Act. 11 
The auditing literature does contain a definition of "reason-
able assurances:" it is basically a cost-benefit analysis. Every busi-
ness decision must balance the cost of a perfect system against the 
cost of any other system or control. If the benefits of a system do 
not outweigh the costs, one would not implement those particular 
controls. That language, however, was not explicitly incorporated 
as part of the statute, and there continues to be debate and uncer-
tainty about exactly what "reasonble assurances" mean, how 
much latitude a board of directors has to make business judg-
ments, and whether the SEC would defer to those business judg-
ments. 
There is also a question regarding state of mind (scienter), 
which relates to enforcement proceedings. In order for the SEC to 
bring an action, does the offender have to violate the Act knowing-
ly? If you scribbled something down without any thought that you 
were doing anything wrong, would that be enough to constitute a 
violation? The SEC took the position that there was no scienter re-
quirement: Congress intended to reach all types of conduct, 
whether negligent, willful, or knowing. Consequently, there was 
disagreement between the ABA, the SEC, and the corporate com-
munity. 
A further issue which needed clarification deals with sub-
sidiaries. The statute expressly addresses issuers, but it does not 
mention the subsidiaries of issuers. A question was raised at 
almost the first conference that was held on the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act about whether the scope of the Act extended to sub-
sidiaries. Speaking for myself, I think it is fairly clear that if the 
11. AICPA STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 1 (Nov. 1972). 
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Act does not include the subsidiaries, its intended purposes would 
be defeated. Nevertheless, the debate about subsidiaries con-
tinues. It becomes especially important when corporations own 
less than fifty percent of their subsidiaries, and consequently do 
not really control them. There may be subsidiaries where the cor-
poration owns fifty percent because it is required by the laws of 
the foreign country, but there is no operating control over that 
subsidiary. There are also companies which own even less of the 
subsidiary. Under the equity method of accounting, one is deemed 
to have significant influence if one owns between twenty and fifty 
percent of the subsidiary. Does that mean that the company can 
dictate how the subsidiary maintains its books and records? It was 
not always clear to a U.S. company which owned twenty-five per-
cent of a foreign company that it could go in and tell the company 
how to maintain its books and records. Many of the foreign com-
panies did not appreciate the U.S. companies instructing them 
about the SEC's new record-keeping requirements. 
III. RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM 
Legislative interest in amending the FCP A was first express-
ed by Senator Chafee of Rhode Island. At about the same time, 
there was a fair amount of debate within the SEC concerning the 
proper interpretation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The 
Commission itself was not of one mind on many issues, and there 
were extensive debates within the Commission. Decisions were 
not lightly reached. In January of 1981, the SEC issued a policy 
statement which, in an effort to blunt the proposed legislation, 
significantly restated the SEC's prior position. In that statement, 
the SEC said that the reasonableness standard did not mandate 
exactness in record-keeping, and the reasonable assurances stan-
dard did not require the achievement of an ideal system. The Com-
mission stated that it recognized that the concept of reasonable-
ness tolerated certain deviations and encompassed cost-benefit 
analysis. It indicated its willingness to be deferential, stating 
that it would only bring actions when there was knowing or reck-
less conduct. This was a significant change from what the SEC had 
said in the past. 
On the question of subsidiaries, the SEC set forth the rebut-
table presumption of responsibility for subsidiaries between twen-
ty and fifty percent. The important thing was that with respect to 
scienter, the SEC would bring actions only for knowing or reek-
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less conduct. That was, in a sense, a scienter standard: the SEC 
was not looking for inadvertent errors, but would instead look to 
top management's degree of involvement as one of its tests to see 
whether it would bring enforc·ement actions. 
If the SEC had come out with its policy statement earlier, it 
might have greatly reduced the uncertainty and the pressure 
which occurred. At this point in time, however, the legislation had 
moved forward. Senate Bill 708, as passed by the Senate, made 
some significant changes in the accounting provision. The first 
change was that the books and records provision, section 13(b)(2)(A), 
was changed to reflect a new objective of internal accounting con-
trol. The purpose of this move was to remove the books and records 
provision as an independent basis for enforcement actions by the 
SEC, but to leave the provision as a component of a system of inter-
nal accounting control. I am not convinced that this is consistent 
with traditional notions of internal accounting control. It probably 
belongs more in a criminal provision if it is intended to facilitate the 
prosecution of bribes or illegal payments. Senate Bill 708 repre-
sents a compromise as it now stands, and I am not sure that it 
accomplishes its purpose. 
In addition, the legislation has decriminalized the accounting 
sanction for issuers who do not maintain a system of internal ac-
counting controls which meets the objectives set forth in the 
FCPA. That should be contrasted to circumvention of a system of 
internal accounting controls which is established. In that situation, 
a person may be either civilly or criminally liable for deliberate 
circumvention of a system established by an issuer. There are new 
scienter provisions put into the Act with respect to the company: 
if a good faith defense is made, the individual must be shown to 
have knowingly caused the issuer to fail to devise or maintain a 
system of internal accounting controls. 
There is also a definition of "reasonable assurances" in the 
legislation which has an interesting provision. It says: 
[F]or the purpose of this section the term "reasonable 
assurances" and "reasonable detail" mean such level of detail 
and degree of assurances that would satisfy prudent individuals 
in the conduct of their own affairs, having in mind a comparison 
between benefits to be obtained and costs to be incurred in ob-
taining such benefits.12 
12. S. 708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 13,983-85 (1981), reprinted in 
Appendix II, infra. 
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The prudent person language comes from testimony by the SEC. 
My problem with it is that it talks about a prudent individual in 
the conduct of his own affairs. I think everyone intended to talk 
about the prudent businessman in the conduct of affairs similar to 
the affairs about which the judgment is being made. I think this 
needs clarification in the hearings that are going on in the House 
at this time. 
IV. FUTURE CHANGES 
The House is continuing to meander through hearings on the 
accounting provisions and they will conduct further hearings this 
term. Whether they actually consider a bill is a question which 
other members of the panel can discuss later this session. The Ad-
ministration has supported S. 708 essentially as it was enacted by 
the Senate, with certain technical changes. 
As a final thought, let me point out that there are different 
views about why the accounting provisions were included in the 
Act. Let me give one reason that may not be immediately ap-
parent, because it is totally unrelated to foreign payments and cor-
rupt practices. Some people believe that auditing in the future will 
move towards auditing systems of internal control, rather than 
auditing the books and records of a corporation, and that this 
movement has been engendered by the internal controls provi-
sions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Its controls force com-
panies to make the initial expenditure to get their systems in good 
shape, and this will produce long-term cost-savings benefits as 
well as changes in the method of accounting. I think that these 
benefits, although in many ways unrelated to the FCPA, have 
been very beneficial. 
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